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Separation and Dependence: Explaining Modern
Corporate Governance
Stephen J. Lubben
I. INTRODUCTION
I used the occasion of my inaugural Wiley lecture to set forth my
understanding of corporate governance; this Essay sets forth the
substance of that lecture. As might be expected from one who spent
their practice career dealing with deviant corporate governance in
Chapter 11, the views expressed here are somewhat different than
most of the extant theory in the area.
For clarity, this Essay will refer to corporate governance as a
“horizontal model” of governance, because the central argument of
this Essay is that key aspects of corporate governance—which the
model identifies as officers, directors, and shareholders—have a
shared role in exercising corporate power. Each has a piece of the
overall quantity of corporate power, but none can take significant
1
corporate action independently. That is, each of the players in
corporate governance has an incomplete piece of corporate power.
In this way, power is separated and also codependent.
In my lecture and in this Essay I explain this horizontal model of
corporate governance by examining each of the three elements of
governance, and explaining the implications of my conception of
governance. But first, thorough analysis requires examination of
some foundational questions. Namely, what is the purpose of
corporate governance and whom does it involve?
* * *
Both scholars and practitioners quite often neglect the goals and
2
aims of corporate governance. Perhaps the purpose of governance is

Harvey Washington Wiley Chair in Corporate Governance & Business Ethics,
Seton Hall University School of Law. I appreciate the time that Tim Glynn and
Oscar Couwenberg took to read and comment on an early draft of these remarks.
1
See Troy A. Paredes, The Firm and the Nature of Control: Toward A Theory of
Takeover Law, 29 J. CORP. L. 103, 120 (2003).
2
E.g., ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., OECD PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE (2004), available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/corporateaffairs
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seen as self-evident—the kind of question only an academic would
ask—but only by understanding the purpose can one identify the key
players.
For example, if one views the purpose of governance as enabling
corporations to do “good” in society, however that might be defined,
then it might be argued that the media is part of governance,
inasmuch as they shame managers into taking certain actions. If so,
then concern may exist about the tendency of the business press to
get quite cozy with the business community, a form of capture that
could undermine this conception of corporate governance. Of
course, taking on the regulation of the business press expands
corporate law and corporate governance in new, uncharted
directions.
In the horizontal model the purpose of corporate governance is
defined as providing structure to the exercise of power within a
corporation, to ensure that power is used to achieve the firm’s goals.
This, of course, requires specification of the goal of corporations.
This Essay focuses on for-profit, public corporations, and therefore
assumes that the fundamental goal of the corporation is to increase
its own value. Doing so benefits all of the participants, however
defined. For example, while this analysis excludes employees or
trade creditors from my conception of corporate governance, they
are the indirect beneficiaries of corporate growth through more
stable employment and product orders.
As a companion goal, this Essay posits that all firms must aim to
survive. More precisely, they must increase their value in ways that
minimize the risk that the firm will destroy its own value. This does
not mean the firm should fear risk, but it does suggest that corporate
governance should not aim to benefit diversified, risk-neutral
shareholders above all else. That is, the firm must maximize its riskadjusted growth, not its potential growth in the abstract.
Specifically, while this Essay conceives of corporate governance
as a means of maximizing firm value, it expressly rejects the notion
that governance must maximize share price. Indeed, the argument is
made that managing to share price is one of the fundamental flaws of
both recent corporate governance and many of the proposed
3
reforms. In this analysis, maximizing firm value, which will typically
also be consistent with maximizing shareholder value, is distinct from
maximizing share price, inasmuch as share price is but an imperfect
/corporategovernanceprinciples/31557724.pdf.
3
William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder
Empowerment, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 653, 667 (2010).
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This point is analyzed in greater detail

* * *
Only by defining the purpose of corporate governance can one
understand its features, since it is necessary to know what features are
relevant to the discussion. The remainder of this Essay will focus on
the three aspects of corporate governance and the ways in which
these parts are both separate from and dependent on each other. It
is this joint reality—separation and dependence—that gives modern
American corporate governance its essential character.
In short, the analysis set forth by this Essay rejects the
conception of corporate governance as a set of linear axes, as
5
famously advanced by Stephen Bainbridge. Instead, power within a
corporation is balanced in three ways, with the officers holding the
bulk of power, but monitored by a largely independent board, which
itself is constrained at the outer margins by shareholders.
Power is concentrated in the managers, who have not only dayto-day authority over the firm, but also a large ability to frame issues
considered by the other branches of power, especially the board. But
the board holds the ultimate power to change the identity of the
managers, the ability to initiate most fundamental transactions under
corporate law, and the authority to bind the corporation as a matter
6
of agency law. As such, the board checks any managerial inclination
7
to ignore the interests of other stakeholders in the firm.
But what if the board fails in its duties? Shareholders hold the
means of preventing this through both voting rights and fiduciary
duties, which prevent the board from acting with extreme malice or
in the board members’ self-interest.
Shareholder power is
intentionally limited to these extreme issues.
This is a conception of corporate governance that is in harmony
with much of the existing academic literature. For example, in
expressly rejecting the notion of shareholders as owners entitled as a
4

Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150 n.12 (Del.

1989).
5

Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate
Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 548 (2003).
6
See, e.g., Thomas Earl Geu, A Selective Overview of Agency, Good Faith and Delaware
Entity Law, 10 DEL. L. REV. 17, 31–32 (2008); Martin Lipton & William Savitt, The
Many Myths of Lucian Bebchuk, 93 VA. L. REV. 733, 755 (2007); Joan MacLeod
Heminway, Enron’s Tangled Web: Complex Relationships; Unanswered Questions, 71 U.
CIN. L. REV. 1167, 1170–71 (2003).
7
See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate
Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 295–96 (1999).
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matter of course to control the firm, the horizontal model adopts a
contractual view of the corporation, which conceives of shareholders
as one of many claimants in a firm.
On the other hand, the horizontal model rejects not only the
8
shareholder supremacy model of the corporation, but the director
primacy and officer primacy versions as well.
This Essay
acknowledges the importance of each and concedes a central role to
officers; however, unlike most, the horizontal model ultimately
describes each as equivalent parts of corporate governance.
At the same time, the horizontal model also rejects the notion
that other stakeholders—like employees or creditors—play an
9
essential role in corporate governance. These stakeholders are
beneficiaries of the system, but have no direct governance role.
In short, the horizontal model conceives of governance as a selfreinforcing scheme to allow managers to do their jobs while guarding
against managerial wrongdoing. Despite the common reference to
“checks and balances,” however, corporate governance is not such a
10
system. For example, the officers have no “check” over shareholders
and indeed such power would make no sense. Thus, instead of
operating as a circular structure of countervailing power, governance
power in a corporation is largely concentrated with the officers. Yet,
like a jigsaw puzzle, the board and—to a lesser degree—the
shareholders, hold essential pieces of that power.
With that overview, this analysis first sets forth the understanding
under the horizontal model of the role of officers in corporate
governance.
II. MANAGEMENT
This analysis begins with the idea that managers—or officers—
have the largest amount of power in a public corporation, although
this does not necessarily mean they have the most important
11
components of power.
While the corporate laws of most states
literally provide that the business of the corporation is to be managed
by or under the direction of the board of directors, it is clear that the
8

Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89
GEO. L.J. 439, 468 (2001).
9
Contra Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Private Debt and the Missing
Lever of Corporate Governance, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1209, 1226–28 (2006).
10
Corporate Governance, FIN. TIMES LEXICON, http://lexicon.ft.com/Term?term
=corporate-governance (last visited Feb. 28, 2013).
11
Lyman Johnson & Robert Ricca, Reality Check on Officer Liability, 67 BUS. LAW.
75, 77–78 (2011).
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board’s function is not actually to manage, but rather to oversee the
management of the company.
Under Delaware corporation law section 142(a), managers
12
exercise delegated power from the board.
This Essay, however,
argues that this delegation does not mean that officers are
subordinate to the board as is often stated or implied. Such a
conception of managers is rooted in the days when boards were
largely comprised of inside directors. In such a case, it was easy to see
the board as the elite of the managers. But today virtually all boards
are independent of management, at least in a formal sense.
Instead, under the horizontal model, management is considered
the first of three parallel elements of corporate governance. On the
trading floor or at the plant, managers make the day-to-day decisions
that have extreme importance for the overall well-being of the
13
corporation and its constituents. Management also has a good deal
of power to set the agenda for the corporation, given its control over
the flow of information to the other elements of corporate
14
governance.
Thus, while it is common to dismiss managers as mere agents
exercising delegated power, the horizontal model suggests that there
is something more at work here. Namely, managers are more
accurately Article II agents, rather than Article I agents. That is,
unlike the Congress exercising specifically defined bits of power
given to the legislature by the Constitution, the managers of a public
company exercise a power more like that held by the President.
The nature of the grant is essentially open ended, subject to
restraint only at the outer margins. And this makes a lot of sense,
since management is the only element of corporate governance that
has day-to-day involvement with the actual operation of the company.
In this way, management is also like the President, who, unlike
Congress or the Supreme Court, never goes on recess, never leaves to
teach summer classes in Europe, and never ceases to exercise the
executive authority granted by the people of the United States.
Boards meet maybe six, eight, or twelve times per year under
normal conditions, and shareholders meet but once a year and even
15
then mostly by proxy and not as a group. The 2011 Public Company
12

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 142(a) (West 2013).
See Timothy P. Glynn, Beyond “Unlimiting” Shareholder Liability: Vicarious Tort
Liability for Corporate Officers, 57 VAND. L. REV. 329, 396 (2004).
14
See generally Lyman P.Q. Johnson & David Millon, Recalling Why Corporate
Officers Are Fiduciaries, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1597, 1605–08 (2005).
15
Robert W. Hamilton, Corporate Governance in America 1950–2000: Major Changes
13
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Governance Survey of the National Association of Corporate
Directors suggests that public company directors spent an average of
16
over 225 hours performing board-related activities in 2011. That is
quite a bit, but it pales in comparison to the work of officers, and
other senior managers, who likely exceed that in a single month.
Only officers are present throughout and thus, it is they who have the
broadest and least defined piece of corporate power.
In short, officers and other managers are agents, but the
horizontal model rejects the implication that as a result they are
unimportant and can be ignored. Thus, while there is merit in the
assertions of Bainbridge, Blair, and Stout, among others, that the role
of shareholders is too often overstated, the tendency to focus solely
on the board-shareholder dynamic and promote hierarchical models
17
of corporate governance is incorrect.
The inclination to ignore officers or managers is
understandable, in that managers are not governed by “law” as
commonly understood by corporate law professors.
Delaware
corporate statutes focus almost exclusively on the board and the case
18
law too has a heavy focus on directors. Indeed, until recently the
Delaware Chancery Court did not have personal jurisdiction over
19
officers.
Instead, the law that governs officers in most situations is agency
law, which remains uncodified in most states. Thus, while corporate
finance scholarship tends to find agents under every rock and bush,
20
managers actually are agents. But to the extent this is ever noted, it
is typically only with regard to officers’ ability to bind the corporation
to a contract with some outside third party. The internal aspects of
the relationship fly under the radar, probably because the board
typically monitors this relationship away from the public eye.
That, of course, does not mean that officers do not wield
tremendous power. It only explains why it so often goes unnoticed.
Managers exercise the most basic aspects of corporate power and
21
therefore play the largest role in corporate governance.
but Uncertain Benefits, 25 J. CORP. L. 349, 363 (2000).
16
NAT’L ASS’N OF CORP. DIRS., NACD PUBLIC COMPANY GOVERNANCE SURVEY
(2012–2013 ed., 2012).
17
Hierarchies, of course, exist in corporations as well as within the elements of
corporate governance that this Essay describes.
18
For the rare exception, see Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695 (Del. 2009).
19
Hillary A. Sale, Delaware’s Good Faith, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 456, 462 n.28 (2004).
20
See Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26
J.L. & ECON. 301, 304 (1983).
21
See Kelli A. Alces, Beyond the Board of Directors, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 783, 827
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III. BOARDS
If officer-managers exercise the greatest role in governance,
22
corporate boards exercise the most important role.
The board
exercises two broad forms of power.
First, it has oversight
responsibility with respect to managers and the corporation. Second,
it has the power to initiate all significant corporate transactions and
changes under Delaware corporate law.
Oversight responsibility means the board has the ability to fire
managers who misbehave. But it also includes something more. It is
now clear under Delaware and federal law that the board has an
obligation to consider how the company operates and whether it is in
23
compliance with relevant law. That involves the board in a kind of
monitoring and information-gathering that requires the board to
work with management to understand the full picture. But the board
also has to go beyond management to understand the perceptions of
all employees regarding the culture of the corporation, including the
level of fear of retaliation for reporting suspected misconduct and
whether employees believe that management is committed to abiding
by the law.
This is a change from the past, when the board was largely an
24
advisor to senior management. But since Sarbanes-Oxley, that role
has changed and should be acknowledged. Further, Dodd-Frank
suggests that there will be no return to the “good old days.”
The board’s oversight responsibility also requires that the board
keep the corporation in sight of its goals of self-preservation, thus
increasing its value. In light of recent events, it is easy to dismiss this
as a problem only for financial institutions, but the automakers,
particularly General Motors (GM), were slow to address problems
25
that had been obvious since at least the 1980s.
And British
Petroleum’s (BP) recent troubles in the Gulf of Texas show that
failures in risk management have serious consequences, the full
extent of which are still unknown, as the government tries to prove
26
gross negligence on BP’s part.
(2011).
22
See Lynn A. Stout, The Shareholder as Ulysses: Some Empirical Evidence on Why
Investors in Public Corporations Tolerate Board Governance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 667, 668
(2003).
23
Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006).
24
Jill E. Fisch, The Overstated Promise of Corporate Governance, 77 U. CHI. L. REV.
923, 930–31 (2010).
25
Levine v. Smith, 591 A.2d 194, 197 (Del. 1991).
26
See generally BP Trial, FIN. TIMES, http://www.ft.com/indepth/bp-trial (last
visited Mar. 14, 2013).
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This is not to say that the board is the corporation’s risk and
compliance manager. That power belongs with management. The
directors should determine the company’s reasonable risk appetite—
for example, financial, safety, reputation, and a myriad of other
risks—and satisfy themselves that the risk management processes
designed and implemented by managers are consistent with the
company’s goals. The board must also make sure that these systems
are functioning as described and that necessary steps have been taken
to foster a culture of risk-adjusted decision-making throughout the
firm.
The board provides the check on the Chief Executive Officer
(CEO) in this context, the only other party with governance power
that is likely to have a clear view of any substantial part of the
operation of a large company.
Under Delaware corporate law, the board is also the holder of
the power to initiate any significant corporate transaction. The idea
will often come from management, but be it an asset sale or a
27
merger, only the board can start the corporation down that path.
This means that the board has a veto over the exercise of power by
either of the other two elements of corporate governance. Similarly,
it is only the board, and not the shareholders or management, that
has the power to bind the corporate entity as a matter of agency law,
further providing a check on the exercise of power by the other
aspects of the firm.
In short, under the horizontal conception of corporate
governance, the board is not primary. Rather, it holds a high degree
of power, but that power is limited to specific, high importance
topics. The difference between this and director primacy is subtle
and mostly turns on the role allocated to managers, as discussed, and
shareholders, discussed below.
IV. SHAREHOLDERS
Shareholders have three rights:
28
1) The right to vote, unless they hold nonvoting shares
2) The right to a dividend, unless the board does not declare
29
one
3) The right to a proportionate share of capital upon

27
28
29

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(b) (West 2013).
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 151, 212 (West 2013).
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 170 (West 2013).
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dissolution, unless the company is insolvent.
These are not the indications of ownership, as commonly
understood. They are signs of weakness. And this Essay submits that
this weakness is by design.
At heart, a share is a measure of one’s interest in a corporation
and nothing more. Any remaining rights are extremely fragile. For
example, if you are a holder of Google class A shares—the primary
publicly traded kind—you receive one-tenth the voting rights of the
31
32
majority shareholders and no dividends. Fortunately, the company
is not insolvent, so you still retain your right to a distribution on
dissolution. Despite this dissipated basket of rights, investors seem
quite eager to buy Google shares. After all, as of this writing it has a
33
market capitalization of about $270 billion.
Most publicly traded corporations do not go this far. Instead,
shareholders retain voting rights under the typical “one share one
vote” regime and they have a right to any dividends paid. For large
companies, these dividends tend to result in small, steady payouts
each quarter.
The voting rights give shareholders a yes/no vote on board
membership. With regard to incumbent members, shareholders are
essentially passing on the members’ past actions. Only in extreme
cases will the shareholder know if a board member’s performance
was lacking. With regard to new members, shareholders’ votes are
essentially a commentary on the actions of the existing board in
selecting the candidate.
Chancellor Allen, now Professor Allen, famously proclaimed that
“[t]he shareholder franchise is the ideological underpinning upon
34
which the legitimacy of directorial power rests.”
This premise
remains true, but only if it is understood that directorial legitimacy is
probably more dependent on informal boundaries. The shareholder
franchise proscribes but a broad frame on managerial and board
power.
The wisdom of shareholder primacy is doubtful, instead

30

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 275, 281(a) (West 2013).
GOOGLE, FOURTH AMENDED AND RESTATED CERTIFICATE OF INCORPORATION OF
GOOGLE INC. (2012), available at http://investor.google.com/pdf/google-fourthamended-and-restated-certificate-of-incorporation.pdf.
32
Google Inc., GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/finance?client=ob&q=NASDAQ
:GOOG (last visited Mar. 11, 2013).
33
Google Market Cap, YCHARTS, http://ycharts.com/companies/GOOG/market
_cap (last visited Mar. 14, 2013).
34
Blasius Indus. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del. Ch. 1988).
31
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governance should advance corporate interests, which often, but not
always, correspond with shareholder interests in some general sense.
Those who would advance shareholder primacy have some obligation
to explain which shareholder should be prime: the retiree investor,
the thirty-something investor, the index mutual fund, or the hedge
fund that owns the shares as part of a larger basis trade. It is also
likely that their interests are only aligned when considered at a very
general level.
Given the disparate interests of the shareholders, it makes sense
that their power is limited to policing the edges of directorial power.
While their interests are diverse, it seems likely that none would
countenance dishonest board members.
Too often the weakness of the shareholder franchise is
denounced by some false analogy to political voting rights. When an
investor buys a share, he or she buys an interest in a corporation that
comes with weak voting rights. There is no similarity between that
investment interest and the denial of a person’s political rights on the
35
basis of race, protected by the Fifteenth Amendment, or sex,
36
protected by the Nineteenth Amendment, or age, protected by the
37
Twenty-Sixth Amendment. Among other things, share ownership is
a choice, entered into with knowledge of the rights that come in
exchange for the investment.
Shareholders are interest holders in the firm—holding a distinct
kind of interest that comes with specified powers. They are not
owners and they have no democratic entitlement to vote.
* * *
One may note that this analysis has yet to even mention fiduciary
duties. This is intentional, as it is not the shareholders who are the
38
beneficiary of these duties, but rather the corporation.
In the
original English corporate cases, dating back to the middle of the
Nineteenth Century, shareholders had no power to enforce such
39
corporate obligations.
Rather, it was a power that rested in the
board alone.
35

U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
37
U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI.
38
Lewis v. Knutson, 699 F.2d 230, 237–38 (5th Cir. 1983) (“When an officer,
director, or controlling shareholder breaches a fiduciary duty to the corporation, the
shareholder has ‘no standing to bring [a] civil action at law against faithless directors
and managers,’ because the corporation and not the shareholder suffers the injury.
Equity . . . , however, allow[s] him to step into the corporation’s shoes and to seek in
its right the restitution he could not demand on his own.” (citation omitted)).
39
Foss v. Harbottle, (1843) 67 Eng. Rep. 189; 2 Hare 461.
36
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In modern times, shareholders enforce the duties in but limited
40
circumstances, and do so on behalf of the corporation as a whole.
Essentially, the shareholders are limited to acting as a backstop to the
board, protecting corporate interests only when the board fails to do
so. In this respect, the derivative suit acts as a supplemental check on
board corruption or incompetence. But it is necessary to keep in
mind the limits. Not only are shareholder actions limited by the
41
demand requirements, but the subject of such actions is limited to
breaches of the duty of loyalty.
Duty of care violations are typically protected by the twin pillars
of the business judgment rule and, in most states, strong exculpation
42
provisions. The only duty of care claims that survive are those so
egregious that they amount to de facto duty of loyalty violations.
V. IMPLICATIONS
Under the horizontal conception of corporate governance,
managers have the bulk of corporate power, but not the most
important bits. Those belong to the board, which has important
powers over a limited set of key issues. Shareholders provide
boundaries to the exercise of power by both the board and
management. Shareholders are a disorganized bunch that typically
only unite to exercise this power in extreme situations, but otherwise,
43
the ability of shareholders to control board action is quite limited.
This is by design, allowing management and the board to exercise the
discretion with which they have been vested and to run the business
of the corporation.
This horizontal conception of corporate governance also
explains the rather limp duty of care, particularly in Delaware. A
more robust duty of care, enforceable by shareholders, would allow
the shareholders to intrude on the power of managers and the board.
But if one accepts this understanding of corporate governance, as this
analysis does, then it leads to several other important implications.
First off, because this conception of governance is based on a
40

See, e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985)
(“[A] court will not substitute its judgment for that of the board if the latter’s
decision can be ‘attributed to any rational business purpose.”‘).
41
Derivative Actions by Shareholders, Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 327 (West 2013);
see also Shareholder Derivative Actions, CAL. CORP. CODE § 800 et seq. (West 2013).
42
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (West 2013) (contents of certificate of
incorporation); see also CAL. CORP. CODE § 12371 (West 2013) (standards of
performance).
43
See Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L. REV. 675,
679–94 (2007).
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balance of powers, things that undermine that balance should be
approached with skepticism. Not to say that change is impossible, or
that the status quo is perfect, but rather, such changes should be
examined carefully before proceeding. Some recent changes have
44
been enacted without careful study. For example, recent decades
have seen a move away from salary toward share-based compensation.
Salary has dropped to less than twenty percent of total executive pay
45
in the United States (from forty-two percent as recently as 1993).
But share based compensation can blur lines between centers of
power and provide incentives that would not normally exist. Under
generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), profits can be
manipulated in a way that will not become clear for years and
bonuses are quite often paid out for shorter-term improvements in
earnings or share price. Therefore, share-based compensation
merely drives short-termism and manipulation.
Shareholder empowerment moves, which have been quite
common in recent years, similarly risk disrupting the system and
allowing shareholders to intrude into the separate space the law has
traditionally given to officers and directors. The trade-off between
short- and long-term growth is particularly plain when hedge funds
and other shareholders press boards for stock buybacks, special
dividends, spin-offs, and other transactions.
The board and
management must have some degree of space to achieve overall
corporate objectives, which are often not the same thing as
maximizing the share price here and now.
Too much of corporate governance has been driven, even coopted, by the faith in modern finance—that is, post-war finance. In
the world of corporate finance, share prices represent company value
perfectly.
But this is also a world in which all investors have the same
understanding and beliefs about share value, investors can buy stocks
on margin at the same rate the government pays on money investors
deposit in Treasury securities, and returns are symmetric and
investors are equally adverse to up and down movements in share
46
price. To varying degrees, none of this is true, so should there be so
much faith in the notion that capital markets are efficient all of the
time either?
44

Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate
Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1585 (2005).
45
M. Alix Valenti & Michael Wolfe, From 1993 to 2003: Changes to Executive Pay, 23
J. OF COMPENSATION & BENEFITS 6 (2007).
46
STEPHEN J. LUBBEN, CORPORATE FINANCE (forthcoming 2014).
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There is no real assurance that observed prices are a meaningful
indication of long-term company value, rather than the current
supply and demand for the shares. Of course, supply and demand
are somewhat affected by expectations of long-term value, but they
are also affected by additional considerations, such as whether the
company is included in an index in which many funds invest, and
whether the company is a good proxy for another firm in the industry
that is part of a large arbitrage strategy.
For example, I was told that during the GM bankruptcy one
common trade was to buy GM debt and short Ford stock. That gave
the shareholder the return GM was paying in its Chapter 11 plan, but
took out the general auto industry risk associated with the trade. It
also likely had an affect on Ford share prices that revealed nothing
about the value of Ford as a corporation.
It is often argued that maximizing shareholder wealth by
maximizing share price is a sensible objective only if we have some
47
belief that prices are meaningful —there are real reasons to doubt
this. Thus, the idea of increasing shareholder power to make
directors and management more sensitive to maximizing share price,
gives reason for pause.
Again, this does not mean all is right with the status quo. For
example, boards have done a particularly poor job of tackling the
problem of underperforming directors. Indeed, sometimes they
seem to encourage underperformance.
Too often boards seem to be risk adverse in their selections,
picking the same directors that every other big corporation has on its
board. But if one sits on four or five big corporate boards, and has a
full-time job, there is reason to believe that they will not have
adequate time or attention to devote to all. This is particularly true
because the board members that also have full-time jobs are generally
not working on a nine-month academic calendar and are in roles that
go beyond a nine-to-five workday.
The responsibilities and time commitments required for board
service today, as well as the complexity of risk management,
reporting, and other issues that directors must oversee, has raised the
bar for effective board service. The time has come for boards to
think outside the box with regard to membership.
As a result, they might also address, however unintentionally, the
other legitimate concerns many have with regard to the diversity of
47
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current S&P 500 boards. If for nothing else, doing so might reduce
the equally troubling tendency toward groupthink that too many
financial institution boards have exhibited in the past decade.
Expertise is important, but not if it comes at the price of directors not
asking the hard questions.
This is an area where boards have only themselves to blame for
misguided provisions like Dodd-Frank’s proxy access rule, which
would require companies to give investors a right to place their
nominees to the board of directors on the company’s proxy
48
materials, making it easier for shareholders to trigger contested
elections. The provision undermines the balance of power in the
horizontal model of corporate governance—but it is a natural
response to the board as insider club phenomena.
The rule is on hold due to the Court of Appeals for the D.C.
49
Circuit’s ruling in Business Roundtable v. SEC. But the composition of
the D.C. Circuit is not static, and the SEC will undoubtedly try again.
Therefore, boards will have a limited amount of time to fix the
problem themselves.
* * *
The horizontal conception of corporate governance provides a
good description of the current reality of American corporate
governance. Shareholders do not have anything like ownership
power, so the practice of calling them “owners” should be
discontinued. The board is powerful, but it is not a full-time
institution. Its power is limited to those high-level functions that
must be trusted to someone other than management.
And
management, too often neglected, is really a key source of much dayto-day power, and consequently the holder of most, but not all,
corporate power.
Beyond the descriptive, should there also be normative changes?
That is, should corporate governance be different than it is? While
there is unquestionably opportunities for improvement, future
attempts to address the issue must be more thoughtful. After all, the
current model seems to have worked fairly well since its introduction
50
almost a century ago here in New Jersey. Others, like those used in
England and the Netherlands, have worked quite well too—there is
no need to be parochial about reform.
To be sure, the horizontal model does not always work to its
48
49
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own, internal potential.
Companies, particularly in the
pharmaceutical industry, continue to acknowledge compliance
51
violations again and again.
The recent problems at Chase, both in trading and in money
transfers, Citibank’s recent settlement of post-Lehman mortgage
underwriting problems, and even the New York Stock Exchange’s
favorable treatment of insiders, suggest that that industry still has a
52
long way to go in developing a new culture.
Nonetheless, the
financial industry seems to be expending a lot of effort fighting
regulation, when it would have more credibility in this regard if it got
its own house in order. Rather than tinkering with the model itself,
this may be the most rational place to begin.
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